ABSTRACT Public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) enables users to search on encrypted data, which is applicable to the scenario of sharing data in the cloud storage. In this paper, we focus on how to construct a PEKS scheme via obfuscation. Our basic scheme is built on the differing-inputs obfuscation (diO) and can be considered as an initial attempt to apply diO in the PEKS field. The scheme supports searching on encrypted data by providing to the cloud server an obfuscated simple ''decrypt-then-compare'' circuit with the secret key and the queried keyword hardwired in it. More interestingly, the scheme can be simply improved to resist off-line keyword guessing attacks (KGAs) as the standard PEKS scheme rather than a designated tester one. For complex search conditions, our scheme can be easily extended to multiple functionalities, such as conjunctive and fuzzy keyword search. Furthermore, it can be extended to the PEKS scheme in the multi-user setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
As cloud can provide elastic and highly available storage service, many users decide to outsource their data in the cloud storage with the basic requirement that the cloud should supply some mechanisms, such as access control [1] , [2] , trust management [3] , [4] , auditing [5] - [8] , etc. Further, as the data owners lose full control of the outsourced data and cannot prevent malicious cloud server from reading their data, they have to encrypt the sensitive data before outsourcing it to the cloud. By this way, confidentiality of the data is guaranteed. However, as the cloud server cannot read the original data, it causes a problem of searching over the encrypted data without decrypting it. To resolve this problem, some encrypted database management systems [9] , [10] have been proposed while some other works focused on the keyword-based search on encrypted data which is also called ''searchable encryption''. The notion of searchable encryption is proposed and studied in two lines. One is in
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private key model like [11] - [20] , the other is in public key model, i.e., the concept of Public-Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS). In a PEKS scheme, a sender uploads encrypted data to a server along with a list of ciphertexts for each keyword associated with the data encrypted under a receiver's public key. Then, the receiver can send to the server a trapdoor of a keyword which can be used by the server to test the encrypted keywords list, and obtain the matched index of the data containing the keyword from the server.
A. RELATED WORKS AND OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
Since the initial PEKS scheme [21] constructed from identity-based encryption (IBE) [22] , there have been a lot of researches emerging to enhance the PEKS. Abdalla et al. [23] showed that it is the anonymity of IBE that ensures a PEKS ciphertext reveals no information about the keyword and presented an improved universal transformation from anonymous IBE to PEKS. In functionality, there are various PEKS schemes proposed to search on complex conditions. For examples, Boneh and Waters [24] proposed a PEKS scheme which supports conjunctive, subset, and range comparisons over the keywords. Sedghi et al. [25] presented a PEKS scheme which supports queries for keywords containing wildcards based on hidden vector encryption scheme. Lai et al. presented a more expressive and efficient construction in [26] . A new notion of attribute-based keyword search in encrypted data was studied in [27] and [28] , and the works in [29] - [34] studied the severe vulnerability of PEKS to the off-line keyword guessing attacks (KGA).
The KGA attack was first introduced by Byun et al. [29] depending on the fact that the keyword space is somewhat small in the real world. In an off-line keyword guessing attack, the attacker (a malicious user or malicious server) can generate the PEKS ciphertexts for some keywords and test the obtained trapdoor with the ciphertexts to get the information about the keyword of the trapdoor. Byun et al. [29] left an open problem to construct secure PEKS schemes against keyword guessing attacks. A well-known method to solve this problem is introducing a modified definition of PEKS called ''searchable public key encryption with a designated tester (dPEKS)'' [31] in which the server's public key is used in the keyword ciphertext and trapdoor generation algorithms so that only the server can execute the test algorithm correctly using its corresponding secret key. In this way, dPEKS schemes can only resist keyword guessing attacks performed by malicious users. To prevent a malicious server from guessing the keyword, Huang and Li [34] proposed ''Public-key Authenticated Encryption with Keyword Search (PAEKS)''. However, in their scheme, the trapdoor for a keyword keeps the same, which does not satisfy ''trapdoor indistinguishability''. Meanwhile, it does not satisfy ''ciphertext indistinguishability''. Actually, a malicious server can figure out the keyword associated with a keyword ciphertext without a trapdoor generated by the receiver.
As data will always be shared between users of the cloud, it is desiderated to construct PEKS schemes in the multi-user setting. The trivial method to construct a PEKS scheme in the multi-user setting is that the data owner encrypts keywords for each receiver which increases burdens of the data owner and the communication overheads. To solve the problem, there are mainly two kinds of measures according to whether or not a trusted third party (TTP) exists. The TTP manages the user's key which helps a user to generate the trapdoor when the user wants to search on the encrypted data from a data owner [35] - [37] . The schemes without TTP usually either need to predetermine the users and pre-compute some parameters by all the users [38] - [40] , or let the data owner play a role of TTP [41] .
1) OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we focus on how to construct a public-key encryption with keyword search scheme (PEKS) via obfuscation. To our delight, we find that differing-inputs obfuscation [42] can be used to build PEKS schemes. We apply differing-inputs obfuscation in PEKS field and obtain several interesting theoretical results. 1 We summarize our contributions as follows:
• Adopt differing-inputs obfuscation to design a new PEKS scheme with single-keyword search. We set the keyword ciphertext as the ciphertext of the keyword encrypted by a standard public-key encryption (PKE) scheme under the receiver's public key and set the trapdoor as the obfuscated ''decryptthen-compare'' circuit with the secret key and the queried keyword hardwired in it. To make it succeed in proving the security, we use the ''double encryption'' paradigm [43] in constructing the program to be obfuscated.
• Improve the efficiency of our basic PEKS scheme and extend it to resist off-line keyword guessing attacks. We slightly change the implementation model of PEKS, i.e., the receiver generates an obfuscated circuit of the search circuit and sends it to the tester only once. Meanwhile, a trapdoor for a keyword w is set as double encryptions of it under the receiver's public key. The trapdoor also contains a signature of the keyword w under the receiver's signing key to guarantee that only the receiver can generate a valid trapdoor. To make our scheme secure against keyword guessing attacks, a signature of the keyword under the sender's signing key is added in the keyword ciphertext to ensure that the tester cannot generate a valid keyword ciphertext of a guessing keyword and test it with a trapdoor. Compared with dPEKS schemes resisting KGA attacks, our scheme is a standard PEKS scheme rather than a PEKS scheme with a designated tester, i.e., our scheme can resist the malicious server, and any tester who obtains the keyword ciphertext and the trapdoor can execute the test algorithm.
• Extend our PEKS scheme to that in the multi-user setting. In the scheme, the sender can provide the tester with an obfuscated circuit which makes a re-encryption of a keyword ciphertext destined for user i and turns it into that for user j. Then the tester can implement keyword search on the keyword ciphertext for user j with the trapdoors generated by user j. Compared with other PEKS schemes in the multi-user setting, our scheme neither needs to predetermine all users and pre-compute keyword ciphertexts for all users [38] , [39] , nor needs a cooperative computation process [40] or a trusted third party to manage the user's key [35] - [37] .
• Our scheme can be easily extended to schemes which support other functionalities, such as multiple keywords search, fuzzy keyword search, etc.
2) REMARK
As our proposed PEKS schemes are based on cryptographic obfuscation, the usability of them depends on the efficiency and security of the cryptographic obfuscation schemes. We have to admit that our schemes are not implementable currently as a whole and we cannot supply full experimental performance of our scheme. This is mainly because we still do not know how to construct a secure cryptographic obfuscation until now. There are a few candidates, but to the best of our knowledge, they are all broken. Actually, there are several works about other cryptographic primitives based on obfuscation, such as functional encryption [44] , deniable encryption [45] , verifiable searchable symmetric encryption [46] , proofs of retrievability [47] , multi-party key exchange [48] , [49] , proxy re-encryption [50] , [51] . All these works have no experimental result about the concrete performance due to the same reason. Nevertheless, our schemes can be used in practice once cryptographic obfuscation can be efficiently implemented in the future. Thus, we believe that our work is of theoretical significance and is of potentially practical significance.
B. ORGANIZATION
In Section 2, we review some preliminaries. In Section 3, we give the basic construction of our PEKS scheme and extend it to that secure against off-line keyword guessing attacks. We give a theoretical analysis of our extended scheme and show how to construct a PEKS scheme supporting complex functionalities based on it. We also show how to extend it to that in the multi-user setting. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 4.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we recall some basic notions, terminologies.
A. PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION
Public key encryption (PKE) scheme [43] consists of three polynomial-time algorithms denoted by PKE = (PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec). The randomized key generation algorithm PKE.KeyGen takes the security parameter as its input and outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk). The probabilistic encryption algorithm PKE.Enc, on inputs a message m ∈ M and a public key pk, chooses random coins from Rnd and uses these coins to output a ciphertext c. The deterministic decryption algorithm, on inputs a ciphertext c and a secret key sk, either outputs a message m or an error symbol ⊥. 
A signature scheme [52] is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen,Sig,Ver) satisfying the following:
1) The key-generation algorithm KeyGen takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs the public/signing key pair (pk, sk).
2) The signing algorithm Sig takes as input a signing key sk and a message m from some underlying message space. It outputs a signature σ ← Sign(sk, m).
3) The deterministic verification algorithm Ver takes as input a public key pk, a message m, and a signature σ . It outputs 1 meaning valid and 0 meaning invalid.
1) EUF-CMA SECURITY
A signature scheme SIG=(KeyGen, Sig,Ver) is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen-message attack (EUF-CMA) if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the following advantage Adv
(λ) of the adversary is a negligible function in λ.
The signing oracle Sig(sk, m, Q) works as following:
Let R be an NP relation on pairs (x, y) with corresponding language L R = {y|∃xs.t.(x, y) ∈ R}. A non-interactive zeroknowledge (NIZK) argument for a relation R [53] consists of three algorithms (Setup,P,V) with syntax:
1) The parameter setup algorithm Setup takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a common reference string (CRS).
2) The prove algorithm P takes as input y, the witness x of y ∈ L R , and creates an argument π ← P CRS (x, y) that R(x, y) = 1.
3) The verification algorithm V takes as input y and an argument π , and outputs 1/0 meaning that the argument π is correct or not. We require that the following three properties hold:
• Soundness: For all PPT adversary A,
• Zero Knowledge: There exists an efficient simulator S=(S 1 , S 2 ) such that for all PPT adversaries A,
, where the experiments Expt A (λ) and Expt S A (λ) are defined as follows:
where S CRS (x, y, AUX )=S 2 CRS (y, AUX ).
D. DIFFERING-INPUTS OBFUSCATORS FOR CIRCUITS
The notion of differing-inputs obfuscation was proposed by Barak et al. [42] stating that for any two circuits C 0 , C 1 with negligible probability that there exists input x on which C 0 (x) = C 1 (x), it should also be hard to distinguish the obfuscation of C 0 from that of C 1 .
Let {C λ } be a differing-inputs circuit family associated with a PPT Sampler which satisfies that for every PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function (λ) such that:
A uniform PPT algorithm diO is called a differing-inputs obfuscator for differing-inputs circuit family {C λ } if the following conditions are satisfied:
• Correctness: For all security parameters λ ∈ N, for all C ∈ {C λ }, for all input x, we have
• Polynomial slowdown: There exists a universal polynomial p such that for any circuit C, we have
• Differing-inputs: For any (not necessarily uniform) PPT algorithms D, there exists a negligible function (λ) such that the following holds: For all security parameters λ ∈ N, for (C 0 ,
III. PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION WITH KEYWORD SEARCH VIA DIFFERING-INPUTS OBFUSCATION
Technique Outline. In public-key encryption with keyword search, if the tester is allowed to decrypt the keyword ciphertext, which is encrypted by the receiver's public key, the keyword search can easily be achieved by the ''decrypt-thencompare'' approach. In this section, we adopt this approach by using the power of differing-inputs obfuscation, i.e., we set the keyword ciphertext as the ciphertext of the keyword encrypted by a standard public-key encryption scheme under the receiver's public key and set the trapdoor as the obfuscated ''decrypt-then-compare'' circuit. We hardwire the receiver's secret key and the queried keyword in this circuit.
To make the trapdoors for the same keyword indistinguishable, we can hardwire a randomness coin in this circuit in addition.
A. PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION WITH KEYWORD SEARCH: THE MODEL
A PEKS scheme [21] consists of four PPT algorithms (Setup, PEKS, Trapdoor, Test) as follows:
• PEKS.Setup(λ): It takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk) for a user.
• PEKS.PEKS (pk,w): It takes as input a public key pk and a keyword w, and outputs a PEKS ciphertext CT of w.
• PEKS.Trapdoor(sk,w ): It takes as input a secret key sk and a keyword w , and outputs a trapdoor T w of w .
• PEKS.Test(pk,CT,T w ): It takes as input a public key pk, a PEKS ciphertext CT ←PEKS(pk, w) and a trapdoor T w , outputs 1 if w = w and 0 otherwise. The IND-PEKS-CPA security for PEKS schemes is defined by the following game between an adversary A and a challenger C:
• Setup: Taking as input a security parameter λ, the challenger C runs (pk, sk) ←PEKS.Setup(λ) and sends the public key pk to A.
• Phase 1: Upon receiving the Trapdoor queries for the keyword w from A, C responds with T w ←PEKS.Trapdoor(sk, w).
• Challenge: When A sends C two keywords w 0 , w 1 where |w 0 | = |w 1 | with the restriction that they had not been asked for trapdoors in Phase 1, C picks a random bit b and sends c * ←PEKS.PEKS(pk, w b ) to A as the challenge ciphertext.
• Phase 2: A can continue to issue Trapdoor queries for any keyword w with the restriction that w = w 0 , w 1 . C responds the same way as in Phase 1.
• Guess: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess b and succeeds if b = b. The advantage of the adversary A in this game is defined as Adv B. THE BASIC SCHEME Let PKE=(KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an IND-CPA secure publickey encryption scheme and (P, V) be an adaptively-secure non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. Our PEKS scheme (Setup, PEKS, Trapdoor, Test) is constructed as follows:
• PEKS.Setup(λ): It runs (pk 1 , sk 1 ) ←PKE.KeyGen(λ), (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ←PKE.KeyGen(λ), and sets user's public/secret key pair as ((pk 1 , pk 2 , r ← {0, 1} poly(λ) ), sk 1 ).
• PEKS.PEKS (pk,w): Let w be the keyword included in a data file. It computes the PEKS ciphertext CT of w as CT = (C 1 , C 2 , ), where C 1 ←PKE.Enc(pk 1 , w; r 1 ), C 2 ←PKE.Enc(pk 2 , w; r 2 ), ← P(r, (C 1 , C 2 ), (w, r 1 , r 2 )), and r 1 , r 2 are the random coins used by PKE.Enc algorithm.
• PEKS.Trapdoor(sk,w ): It generates a searching circuit P search which is demonstrated in Algorithm 1. Then P search is securely obfuscated to a differing-inputs obfuscation circuit diO(P search ). The trapdoor T w is set as diO(P search ).
• PEKS.Test(pk,CT,T w ): It puts the keyword ciphertext CT into trapdoor T w , i.e. the differing-inputs obfuscation circuit diO(P search ), and returns the output of diO(P search ). Proof. We prove the security through a sequence of indistinguishable games. Game 0 : is the IND-PEKS-CPA security game of PEKS. Game 1 : is the same as Game 0 , except that upon receiving the Trapdoor queries for a keyword, the challenger generates a searching circuit P search which is demonstrated in Algorithm 2. Then the challenger securely obfuscates it to get the differing-inputs obfuscation circuit diO(P search ) and responds the query with diO(P search ). Game 2 : is the same as Game 1 , except that instead of (P, V), its simulator is used to provide the proof. We denote the simulated proof in this game as . 
Algorithm 1 Search Circuit
Observe that P search and P search have the same functionality. Thus from the security of differing-inputs obfuscator, diO(P search ) and diO(P search ) are computationally indistinguishable. Therefore, Game 1 is indistinguishable from Game 0 .
Game 1 is indistinguishable from Game 2 as if there exists an adversary A to distinguish Game 1 from Game 2 , then it can be used by an adversary A of NIZK to distinguish real proofs from simulated proofs.
Next, we prove the PEKS adversary's advantage in Game 2 is negligible by constructing an adversary against the IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme. Suppose A is an adversary of Game 2 , we can construct an adversary B against the IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme. B interacts with its own challenge C in IND-CPA-secure game and plays the role of the challenger for A in Game 2 as below:
• Setup: Taking as input a security parameter λ, the challenger C runs the (pk 1 , sk 1 ) ←PKE.KeyGen(λ) algorithm and sends the public key pk 1 to B. Then B runs (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ←PKE.KeyGen(λ), r ←Sim 1 (λ) and sends (pk 1 , pk 2 , r) to A as PEKS public key. The challenger C retains the secret key sk 1 .
• Phase 1: Upon receiving the Trapdoor queries for the keyword w from A, B generates a searching circuit P search which is demonstrated in Algorithm 2. 2 Then B securely obfuscates it to get the differing-inputs obfuscation circuit diO(P search ). It forwards diO(P search ) as trapdoor PEKS.T w to A.
• Challenge: When A sends B two keywords w 0 , w 1 where |w 0 | = |w 1 |, B forwards (w 0 , w 1 ) to C. When B receives its challenge ciphertext C ←PKE.Enc(pk 1 , w β ), it computes C 2 ←PKE.Enc(pk 2 , w 0 ; r 0 ), ←Sim 2 (C 1 ,C 2 ), and sends CT = (C,C 2 , ) to A as challenge ciphertext of PEKS.
• Phase 2: A can continue to issue Trapdoor queries for any keyword w with the restriction that w = w 0 , w 1 .
• Guess: Finally, the adversary B outputs what the adversary A outputs.
We can get that if β = 0 with the probability of 1 2 then B provides a perfect simulation for A. A note on the leakage-resilience. Commonly, the cryptosystems are implemented in the untrusted environment and it is not assumed that cryptographic keys will be securely kept [54] - [56] . The leakage-resilient security considers a kind of side-channel attacks [57] - [59] called keyleakage attacks which can recover a fraction of the secret key to the adversary and provides a theoretical method to design cryptosystems proved secure under key-leakage attacks [60] , [61] . Focusing on a PEKS scheme, the trapdoor leakage was considered in [62] , while constructions secure against the continual secret key leakage occurred in the Trapdoor process were proposed by Hu et al. [63] , [64] . In our basic PEKS scheme above, the trapdoor is generated by obfuscating P search program which only uses the secret key in a decryption implementation of the public-key encryption PKE. Therefore, if the public-key encryption PKE used in P search is leakage-resilient, our basic PEKS scheme is leakage-resilient.
D. EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT AND SECURITY AGAINST KEYWORD GUESSING ATTACKS
In the above construction, the trapdoor is generated as the differing-inputs obfuscation circuit diO(P search ) which is inefficient. To improve the efficiency, we slightly change the implementation model of PEKS. Firstly, the receiver generates a searching circuit C search KGA demonstrated in Algorithm 3. Then the receiver securely obfuscates it to get the differing-inputs obfuscation circuit diO(C search KGA ) and sends diO(C search KGA ) to the tester only once. When a receiver wants to search in the data, he generates a trapdoor for a keyword w as T w = (T w 1 , T w 2 )=(PKE.Enc(pk 1 , w ||sig w ; r 1 ), PKE.Enc(pk 2 , w ||sig w ; r 2 )) and sends it to the tester, where r 1 , r 2 are the random coins used by PKE.Enc algorithm, and sig w is the signature of w under the receiver's signing key to guarantee that only the receiver can generate valid trapdoors. The tester executes diO(C search ) taking keyword ciphertext CT and trapdoor T w as inputs and outputs the search result.
To make our scheme secure against keyword guessing attacks, we also add a signature of keyword w under the sender's signing key in the keyword ciphertext which ensures that the tester cannot generate valid keyword ciphertext of a guessing keyword to test a trapdoor.
Let PKE=(KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme, (P, V) be an adaptivelysecure non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system, and SIG=(KeyGen,Sig,Ver) be a signature scheme achieving Existential UnForgeability against Chosen Message Attack (EUF-CMA secure). Our efficient PEKS scheme (Setup, PEKS, Trapdoor, Test) secure against keyword guessing attacks is constructed as follows:
• PEKS.Setup(λ): It runs (pk 1 , sk 1 ) ←PKE.KeyGen(λ), (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ←PKE.KeyGen(λ), (pk 3 , sk 3 ) ← SIG. KeyGen(λ), and sets user's public/secret key pair as ((pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , r ← {0, 1} poly(λ) ), (sk 1 , sk 3 )).
• PEKS.PEKS (pk,w): Let w be the keyword included in a data file. Let ((pk s 1 , pk s 2 , pk s 3 , r s ← {0, 1} poly(λ) ), (sk s 1 , sk s 3 )) be the sender's public/secret key pair. Let ((pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , r ← {0, 1} poly(λ) ), (sk 1 , sk 3 )) be the receiver's public/secret key pair. It obtains a signature sig w of w under the sender's signing key sk s 3 and computes the PEKS ciphertext CT of w as CT = (C 1 , C 2 , ), where C 1 ←PKE.Enc(pk 1 , w||sig w ; r 1 ), C 2 ←PKE.Enc(pk 2 , w||sig w ; r 2 ), ← P(r, (C 1 , C 2 , (w, r 1 , r 2 )), and r 1 , r 2 are the random coins used by PKE.Enc algorithm.
• PEKS.Trapdoor(sk,w ): The receiver first generates a searching circuit C search KGA which is demonstrated in Algorithm 3. Then C search KGA is securely obfuscated to a differing-inputs obfuscation circuit diO(C search KGA ). It sends diO(C search KGA ) to the tester only once. In the following, to search files with keyword w , the receiver sets the trapdoor for w as T w =(T w 1 , T w 2 )=(PKE.Enc(pk 1 , w ||sig w ; r 1 ), PKE.Enc(pk 2 , w ||sig w ; r 2 ), where sig w is the signature of w under the receiver's signing key sk 3 and r 1 , r 2 are the random coins used by PKE.Enc algorithm. Then the receiver sends T w to the tester.
• PEKS.Test(pk,CT,T w ): The tester executes diO(C search KGA ) taking keyword ciphertext CT and trapdoor T w as inputs, and outputs the search result.
Theorem 2.
The above scheme is IND-PEKS-CPA secure. Proof. The IND-PEKS-CPA security of the improved scheme can be proved similar to that of our basic PEKS scheme. We also need a sequence of games as follows: Game 0 : is the IND-PEKS-CPA security game of PEKS. Note that in this game, the challenger only generates the obfuscated circuit diO(C search KGA ) once and can send it to the adversary in Setup phase. Game 1 : is the same as Game 0 , except that the challenger generates a obfuscated searching circuit diO(C search KGA ) instead of diO(C search KGA ) where C search KGA is demonstrated in Algorithm 4.
Game 2 : is the same as Game 1 , except that instead of (P, V), its simulator is used to provide the proof. We denote the simulated proof in this game as .
Observe that C search KGA and C search KGA have the same functionality. Thus from the security of differing-inputs obfuscator, diO(C search KGA ) and diO(C search KGA ) are computationally indistinguishable. Therefore, Game 1 is indistinguishable from Game 0 . 
Next, we prove the PEKS adversary's advantage in Game 2 is negligible by constructing an adversary against the IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme. Suppose A is an adversary of Game 2 , we can construct an adversary B against the IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme. B interacts with its own challenge C in IND-CPA-secure game and plays the role of a challenger for A in Game 2 as below:
• Setup: Taking as input a security parameter λ, the challenger C runs the (pk 1 , sk 1 ) ←PKE.KeyGen(λ) algorithm and sends the public key pk 1 to B. Then B runs (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ← PKE.KeyGen(λ); (pk 3 , sk 3 ) ← SIG.KeyGen(λ); r ← Sim 1 (λ); and sends (pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , r) to A as PEKS public key. The challenger C retains the secret key sk 1 . B also generates the obfuscated circuit diO(C search ) and forwards it to A.
• Phase 1: Upon receiving the Trapdoor queries for the keyword w from A, B generates T w and sends it to A.
• Challenge: When A sends B two keywords w 0 , w 1 where |w 0 | = |w 1 |, B obtains the signatures of w 0 , w 1 as sig w 0 , sig w 1 respectively under sk 3 and forwards (w 0 ||sig w 0 , w 1 ||sig w 1 ) as its challenge plaintext to C. When B receives its challenge ciphertext C ←PKE.Enc(pk 1 , w β ||sig w β ), it computes
and sends CT = (C,C 2 , ) to A as challenge ciphertext of PEKS. 
return 0 3: else 4 :
if SIG. Ver(pk s 3 , sig w 1 , w 1 else 15: return 0;
We can get that if b = 0 with the probability of 1 2 then B provides a perfect simulation for A. Otherwise, by the zeroknowledge property and soundness of non-interactive zeroknowledge proof system, A will have a negligible advantage in distinguishing the PEKS ciphertext. Thus, B's advantage against IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme equals to 1 2 by the advantage of adversary in Game 2 . Therefore, the advantage of adversary in Game 2 is negligible as the based PKE scheme is IND-CPA-secure. As Game 2 is indistinguishable from Game 0 , advantage of adversary in the IND-PEKS-CPA security game (Game 0 ) is negligible.
Theorem 3. The above scheme is secure against off-line keyword guessing attacks.
Proof. The scheme is secure under keyword guessing attacks as if a KGA adversary can forge a PEKS ciphertext of keywordw which can pass the test of a trapdoor T w then a valid signature of SIG can be forged. We prove the KGA adversary's advantage is negligible by constructing an adversary against the EUF-CMA secure signature scheme. Suppose A is an adversary implementing keyword guessing attacks, we can construct an adversary B against the EUF-CMA secure signature scheme. B interacts with its own challenge C in EUF-CMA game and interacts with A as below:
• Setup: Taking as input a security parameter λ, the challenger C runs the (pk s 3 , sk s 3 ) ←SIG.KeyGen(λ) algorithm and sends the public key pk s 3 to B. Then B runs (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ← PKE.KeyGen(λ);
and sends (pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , r) to A as the receiver's public key. Also, B runs (pk s 1 , sk s 1 ) ←PKE.KeyGen(λ); (pk s 2 , sk s 2 ) ←PKE.KeyGen(λ); r s ←Sim 1 (λ); and sends (pk s 1 , pk s 2 , pk s 3 , r s ) to A as the sender's public key. The challenger C retains the secret key sk s 3 . B also generates the obfuscated circuit diO(C search KGA ) and forwards it to A.
• Challenge: B chooses a keyword w , and generates the trapdoor T w for it. B sends T w to A. Note that B has all the public/secret key pairs of the receiver, it can compute the trapdoor.
• Guess: Finally, A chooses a keywordw. A computes and sends to B the keyword ciphertext CTw ofw. If Test(CTw,T w )=1, B parses PKE.Dec(sk 1 , CTw.C 1 ) as w||sigw, and outputs (w, sigw) as a forged valid signature ofw. We can observe that if A can break the keyword guessing attack security of the PEKS scheme, B can forge a valid signature of SIG. As the signature scheme, SIG is EUF-CMA secure, the advantage of the adversary in keyword guessing attack security game is negligible. Note that compared with other PEKS schemes secure against off-line keyword guessing attacks, our scheme is a standard PEKS scheme allowing anyone to execute the tester process as long as he has the PEKS ciphertexts and trapdoors, while in other schemes, only a designated tester can respond to search queries.
E. PERFORMANCE AND FUNCTIONALITIES
Our scheme can be easily extended to schemes which support other functionalities, such as multiple keywords search, fuzzy keyword search, etc. For example, if we want to enable the scheme with multiple keywords search, we can set the searched keyword as w 1 ||w 2 || · · · ||w n , where w i s are multiple keywords associated with PEKS ciphertext/trapdoor. Then, we will only need to slightly modify the codes from Line 12 to 15 in C search KGA to a suitable keyword-based search algorithm under plaintexts and its corresponding diO circuit. Next, we will give a performance analysis of our improved theoretical obfuscation-based scheme and compare them with some existing works. In our analysis, we focus on the computation and communication overheads in the trapdoor generation and test operation due to the high frequency. To make successful keyword searches, the receiver needs to generate an obfuscated search program diO(C search KGA ) once and sends it to the server. Then the receiver only needs one signing and two public key encrypting operations for each queried keyword. On the server side, to test a trapdoor with keyword ciphertexts, it only needs to execute the obfuscated search program diO(C search KGA ). Table 1 gives the comparison between our scheme and some other schemes resisting keyword guessing attacks. From the comparison, we can see that our improved scheme can achieve several good properties, e.g. no designated tester, resistance to malicious server and easy functionality extension while keeping the asymptotic complexity unchanged.
For concrete efficiency, note that obfuscated search program is executed by the test operation which is inefficient in real life. Therefore, we can only compare the computational time of the trapdoor generation process between our improved scheme and some other schemes resisting keyword guessing attacks. The efficiency is evaluated on a personal computer with Intel Core i7-4600 CPU, and 8GB of DDR3 RAM. Firstly, we evaluate the trapdoor generation performance of our improved scheme. As there only needs to execute signing once and encrypting under public key twice, we use well-known DSA signature scheme and RSA-OAEP public key encryption scheme as the concrete public key cryptosystems. The DSA and RSA-OAEP schemes are implemented in Python by calling modules of PyCrypto (Python Cryptography Toolkit) library [65] , which provides interfaces that can be used to implement cryptographic primitives. Both of the implemented DSA and RSA-OAEP schemes achieve 1024-bit security level. By the implementation, the trapdoor generation time of our improved scheme is about 6.3 ms. Secondly, we obtain the trapdoor generation performance of some other schemes such as [31] , [32] , and [34] . As all of these schemes are constructed in prime order bilinear groups, we implement them based on PBC (Pairing-Based Crypto) Library [66] . In order to obtain the runtime of them and get an accurate comparison, we choose the Type A curve y 2 = x 3 + x and 512-bit security parameter length. The trapdoor generation algorithms of these schemes depend on three basic element operations: element exponentiation in G, pairing and element inverse. Therefore, we first test these element operations in prime order bilinear groups and show the benchmarks in Table 2 . Then we analyze the total computational costs of the trapdoor generation of these schemes based on the benchmarks. The comparison results between our improved scheme and these schemes [31] , [32] , [34] are described in Table 3 and Fig. 1 .
F. EXTENSION TO THE MULTI-USER SETTING
In the multi-user setting, data owner hopes to share their data with multiple users and permits the users to search over the encrypted shared data in the cloud. The above PEKS scheme can be easily extended to a PEKS scheme in the multi-user setting. The technique behind the construction of PEKS scheme in the multi-user setting is that: the data owner provides the cloud server with a differing-inputs obfuscated circuit diO(C re−enc ) which makes a re-encryption [67] of a PEKS ciphertext destined for user i and turns it into that for user j. Then the cloud server can execute this obfuscated circuit to get the PEKS ciphertext for user j and search on it with trapdoors generated by user j. In the PEKS ciphertext of keyword w, we add a ciphertext of w encrypted by a block cipher algorithm such as AES, under a secret key k which is holden secretly by the sender (data owner). This ciphertext is used in the re-encryption circuit C re−enc which is described in Algorithm 5.
Let PKE=(KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be an IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme, (P, V) be an adaptivelysecure non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system, SIG=(KeyGen,Sig,Ver) be an EUF-CMA secure signature scheme and BC=(KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a block cipher algorithm. We describe our PEKS scheme in the multi-user setting as follows:
• PEKS.PEKS (pk,w): Let w be the keyword associated to a data file. 
and r 1 , r 2 are the random coins used by PKE.Enc algorithm.
• PEKS.Trapdoor(sk,w ): The receiver first generates a searching circuit C search KGA which is demonstrated in Algorithm 3. Then C search KGA is securely obfuscated to a differing-inputs obfuscation circuit diO(C search KGA ). It sends diO(C search KGA ) to the tester only once. In the following, to search files containing keyword w , the receiver sets the trapdoor for w as T w =(T w 1 , T w 2 ) where
T w 2 ← PKE.Enc(pk 2 , w ||sig w ; r 2 ), and sig w is the signature of w under the receiver's signing key sk 3 and r 1 , r 2 are the random coins used by PKE.Enc algorithm. Then the receiver sends T w to the tester.
• PEKS.Re-encryption(CT i ,pk j ): The sender provides the tester with an indistinguishability obfuscated circuit diO(C re−enc ) of C re−enc described in Algorithm 5. The tester executes this circuit taking as inputs the keyword ciphertext CT i for user i, the public key pk j of user j, and outputs the keyword ciphertext CT j for user j.
Algorithm 5
Re-encryption Circuit C re−enc Constant: A secret key k of the block cipher scheme holden secretly by the sender, a random key k 1 used to generate randomness by the pseudorandom function. Input: Keyword ciphertext CT i for user i, the public key (pk j 1 , pk j 2 , pk j 3 , r j ) of user j.
Output:
1: w||sig w ←BC.Dec(k, CT i .C 3 ); 2: r 1 ←PRF(k 1 , CT i .C 1 ); 3: CT j .C 1 ←PKE.Enc(pk j 1 , w||sig w ; r 1 ); 4: r 2 ←PRF(k 1 , CT i .C 2 ); 5: CT j .C 2 ←PKE.Enc(pk j 2 , w||sig w ; r 2 ); 6: CT j . ← P(r j , (CT j .C 1 , CT j .C 2 ), (w, r 1 , r 2 )); 7: CT j .C 3 = CT i .C 3 ; 8: return CT j ; Table 4 shows the differences between our scheme and some other schemes in the multi-user setting. Our scheme achieves some good features in the multi-user setting, i.e., constant keyword ciphertext length, no trust third party, supporting dynamic users and resisting keyword guessing attacks.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose public-key encryption with keyword search schemes based on differing-inputs obfuscation as an initial attempt. We present a basic PEKS scheme supporting single-keyword search which can be easily extended to support complex functionalities and to that in the multi-user setting. Moreover, we consider the KGA security of PEKS and improve our basic scheme to resist off-line keyword guessing attacks. Compared with dPEKS schemes resisting KGA attacks, our scheme is a standard one rather than a PEKS scheme with a designated tester. As the constructions are obtained by applying obfuscation, the limitation of our schemes is obvious, i.e., the trapdoor generation process is inefficient which may make them inapplicable in resourcelimited environments. In spite of the results obtained by applying obfuscation in PEKS construction, we must point out that our PEKS schemes fail to verify the correctness and completeness of the search result from the server. We leave it an open problem. 
